Risks
This page lists the ways Encumbra can lose or misdirect value today, what limits each one in the contract, and what is planned but not built.
Each risk concerns the EncumbraLien contract and the surfaces around it. The contract holds every lienLien. A record that an asset backs a debt. Here the contract holds the asset and enforces the terms, so no one has to be trusted to follow them. and its escrowedEscrow. Held by the contract and released only by its own rules, not by any person. collateral. Each risk below has three parts: what can go wrong, what limits it in the code today, and what is planned. Planned items are marked planned, not built. They come from the v1 contract scope listed on Security and admin controls, and none of them is live. Figures marked as tested were run against the compiled contract on an in-process EVM.
| Risk | Who bears the loss | What bounds it today |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Smart contract | Owners and creditors with value in escrow | A test suite only. No audit, pause or upgrade path |
| 2. Oracle | Owners (forced liquidation) and creditors (blocked liquidation) | Same-token and title liens never read it. A zero price reverts |
| 3. Shortfall and bad debt | The creditor | The value of the collateral. No reserve or backstop |
| 4. Keepers and title buy-out | Creditors, and owners with equity in a title | Anyone can liquidate and is paid first |
| 5. Admin key | Everyone with a lien | Each fee at most 10%. Zero addresses refused |
| 6. Appraisal and legal title | Creditors and lessors | Nothing. The owner declares the value |
| 7. Terms set by the owner | The creditor | A schedule can be set once, never while in default |
| 8. Creditor draws | The owner | The credit limit the owner set |
| 9. Agent reputation | Anyone who relies on it | Nothing. The record can be forged |
| 10. Settlement token | Whoever the token issuer blocks | Nothing in the contract |
| 11. Network and infrastructure | Everyone | Public deployments are read-only by default |
| 12. Legal and regulatory | Everyone | Testnet only, no real funds |
1. Smart contract
- What can go wrong
A bug in
EncumbraLien.solcould misdirect or lock the collateral it holds, or let a call succeed that the rules do not intend. Nobody outside the team has audited it.There is no pause, no timelock and no upgrade path. The contract is not a proxy and has no
delegatecall, so a bug found after deployment cannot be switched off or patched in place. The fix is a new contract, and liens on the old one stay there under the old code.- What limits it today
- 42 passing tests across 13 files on an in-process EVM, including 120 fuzzed liquidations and 60 fuzzed title repossessions. Tests cover the cases someone thought of. They are not an audit.
- Escrowed collateral leaves the contract by three functions only:
close,liquidateandliquidateAsset. No other function transfers it. - Every function that moves tokens carries a reentrancy guard:
open,openAsset,repay,addCollateral,payInstallment,liquidate,liquidateAssetandclose.
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- Two private reviews, a competitive contest and a final review of the fixes, with mainnet gated on their completion and the reports published. No dates are scheduled.
- An invariant suite over 24 stated properties, run with Foundry and Medusa.
- An intake pause held by a guardian. It would never cover
repay,closeor liquidation.
2. Oracle
- What can go wrong
A lien whose collateral token differs from its debt token is valued by one global price oracle. If that price is wrong, healthy liens can be liquidated and unhealthy ones can look safe.
- The placeholder oracle in the repository,
MockPriceOracle, lets any address set any token's price, and reports 1.0 for a token with no price set. It stands in for a real feed on a testnet. - The contract reads a bare price: no timestamp, no staleness check, and it assumes collateral and debt tokens have the same decimals.
- The admin can point the contract at a different oracle with
setOracle, for every cross-token lien at once and with no delay. Tested: a lien holding 1,000 tokens against $100 of debt, with a 90% liquidation line, was healthy at a price of 1.00 and liquidatable once the oracle read 0.11. The waterfall then paid out 909 tokens to the creditor, 18 to the treasury and 9 to the keeper, and returned 64 to the owner. If the tokens were really worth 1.00 each, the owner lost about 936 of them to settle $100 of debt. - An oracle can also hold liquidations back. If it reverts, the call reverts. If it reports a zero price, the contract reverts with
bad price. ThenliquidateandisLiquidatablefail even for a lien that is past due (tested), and a price set too high keeps a lien from ever looking under water.repayandclosedo not read the price and keep working.
- The placeholder oracle in the repository,
- What limits it today
- Liens where collateral and debt are the same token, and title liens, never read the oracle. None of this applies to them.
openrefuses a cross-token lien until an oracle is set, and the oracle starts unset, so no cross-token lien exists until the admin sets one.setOraclerefuses the zero address, so the admin cannot clear the oracle to price everything at parity. A zero price reverts rather than being used.- Creditors can read
oracle()andcollateralValue(id)before extending credit.
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- Per-lien oracle binding: each lien snapshots its own feed adapter at open, so changing the default oracle affects new liens only. A change to a live lien needs both the owner and the creditor.
- A maximum price age with an
updatedAtcheck, decimals normalisation, and an L2 sequencer-uptime check. - An auction that sells collateral without needing a price, for a past-due lien whose feed is stale.
3. Collateral shortfall and bad debt
- What can go wrong
A lien can be liquidated for less than it owes. Proceeds follow a fixed waterfallWaterfall. The fixed order that liquidation proceeds are paid in: keeper reward, then the creditor, then the protocol penalty, then whatever is left to the owner.: the keeperKeeper. Anyone who liquidates a lien that is past due or under water. The keeper is paid first from the proceeds, so enforcement does not depend on a single operator. reward first, then the creditor, then the protocol penalty, then the owner. If the collateral is worth less than the debt, the creditor takes the loss. The contract holds no reserve and no backstop. Nothing on-chain pursues the rest: the lien is marked
Liquidated, the unpaid part is recorded asresidualBadDebtin theLiquidatedevent, andrepayno longer accepts payments on it.Three things make a shortfall more likely than the waterfall alone suggests.
opendoes not compare the credit limitCredit limit. The most the creditor can charge on this lien. The contract refuses any charge that would pass it. with the collateral value. A lien with a $1,000,000 limit on $10 of collateral is accepted (tested). The owner also picks the liquidation threshold, up to 100%, which leaves no margin.- A lien is liquidated only when someone calls
liquidate. A price that falls faster than a keeper acts eats the margin. - The keeper reward is paid first and is sized on the debt, not on what is seized. When the collateral is worth less than the reward, the keeper takes all of it.
- What limits it today
- A lien is liquidatable once debt reaches the owner's chosen share of collateral value (90% by default in the SDK), or once it is past duePast due. The settlement deadline has passed with debt still open. Anyone can liquidate a past-due lien..
- A creditor's exposure is the debt it has recorded itself with
charge. It can stop at any time, and can readcollateralValueandhealthFactorbefore each charge. - Same-token liens carry no price risk, only the margin the threshold leaves.
- The keeper reward is senior so that even a deeply under waterUnder water. Debt has reached the liquidation line, so the collateral no longer covers it with margin. Anyone can liquidate. lien is worth liquidating when the reward covers gas.
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- A creditor floor: the keeper's share capped relative to what is seized, plus a flat tip paid outside the seizure.
- A check at
openand ataddCollateralthat the credit limit is covered by collateral at the liquidation threshold. - No reserve or bonded backstop is in the v1 scope. Credit above collateral is not offered in v1.
Worked loss example
A lien owes $1,000 and is liquidated at the default rates (keeper 1%, protocol 2%), with the same token for collateral and debt and no accrued usage fee. The keeper is owed $10, the creditor $1,000 and the protocol $20. What each party receives depends only on what the collateral is worth. The $1,500 and $900 cases match the fees and waterfall page. The $5 case shows the keeper-senior order at its limit.
- Keeper
- Creditor
- Protocol
- Back to owner
- Keeper $10
- Creditor $1,000
- Protocol $20
- Back to owner $470
- Keeper $10
- Creditor $890
- Protocol $0
- Back to owner $0
- Keeper $5
- Creditor $0
- Protocol $0
- Back to owner $0
claims = 10 + 1,000 + 20 = 1,030
seized = min(1,030, 900) = 900
keeper = min(10, 900) = 10
creditor = min(1,000, 900 - 10) = 890
protocol = min(20, 900 - 10 - 890) = 0
creditor loss = 1,000 - 890 = 1104. Keepers and the title buy-out
- What can go wrong
Liquidation is permissionlessPermissionless. No account, approval or allowlist is needed. Any address can call it.: anyone can call it, but nobody is obliged to. If no keeper acts, a defaulted lien stays open and the creditor waits. There is no competitive keeper network, no priority window and no backstop keeper today.
- The reward is a percentage of the debt (1% by default) with no flat tip, so on a small lien it may not cover gas.
- For a titleTitle token. A token that stands for one physical asset, such as a machine or a vehicle. The contract holds it as collateral. Legal title and physical recovery still follow local law.-backed lease, the keeper calls
liquidateAssetand must pay the declared appraised value up front, in the debt token. Tested with a $60,000 title and $8,000 of debt: the keeper paid $60,000 and received $80 back plus the title. The creditor got $8,000, the protocol $160 and the owner $51,760. That only makes sense for a keeper that can sell the title for more than $59,920. - The contract does not check that the declared value is realistic. A value set too high leaves no keeper willing to buy, so the creditor's remedy stalls. A value set too low caps the owner's surplus below the title's worth.
- What limits it today
- Any address can liquidate. The reward is paid first, from the proceeds, so a keeper does not depend on the creditor or the owner paying it.
- A past-due lien is liquidatable the moment the due date passes. Nobody has to prove anything first.
- The repository includes a reference keeper bot. Encumbra does not guarantee that any keeper is running.
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- A flat keeper tip, paid outside the seizure, and a cap on the keeper's share of proceeds.
- A title auction that replaces the fixed-price buy-out. The price would start above the appraised value and decay over 72 hours, with owner redemption until the sale.
5. Admin key
- What can go wrong
One address,
admin, controls three functions. It is the deploying address at launch, and it can be changed in one call. A leaked or malicious admin key can do the following, all with no delay. A lost key means none of it can ever be changed.- Set each of the three fees to the 10% cap and redirect the treasury. Fee changes apply to liens already open. Tested: a $1,000 lien backed by $1,000 of collateral pays the creditor $990 at the default 1% keeper reward, and $900 if the admin raises it to 10% before the liquidation.
- The cap applies to each fee on its own, not to their sum. At the cap, the keeper reward and the protocol penalty can take 20% of the debt on a liquidation, and the usage fee 10% of every charge.
- Repoint the oracle, which can force liquidations (risk 2).
- Hand the role to any non-zero address. The new address does not have to accept it, so a mistyped address cannot be undone.
- What limits it today
MAX_FEE_BPSis a constant, 1,000 bps (10%), checked in the constructor and for each fee insetParams.- The treasury, the oracle and the admin cannot be set to the zero address.
- No admin function writes to a lien, withdraws escrowed collateral or stops repayment. The oracle is the one indirect lever, and it works both ways: it can force liquidations and it can block them for cross-token liens.
setParamsemitsParamsUpdated.setOracleandtransferAdminemit nothing, so readoracle()andadmin()directly.
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- A 3-of-5 multisig behind a 48-hour timelock for fee, oracle and admin changes, a two-step admin transfer, and an intake-only guardian pause. Signers are not chosen.
- Alerts on
ParamsUpdatedand on oracle changes.
6. Appraisal and legal title
- What can go wrong
A title token is a record in the contract. It is not legal title to the asset, and holding one gives no right to possession.
- The appraised value is declared by the owner at
openAsset. The contract checks only that it is above zero. It cannot verify that the asset exists, is in the stated condition, or that the owner may pledge it. The value also decides whether the lien can be under water. isAssetEnabledis a signal. Whether a device actually stops, and whether that is lawful, depends on the lessor's hardware and local law. In the US, UCC 9-609 limits self-help repossession to what can be done without breaching the peace, California Civil Code 2983.37 regulates starter-interrupt devices, and the CFPB treats wrongful disablement as repossession (Bulletin 2022-04). Other places have their own rules.- On default, the on-chain remedy runs without a court, up to the value of the collateral. Recovering the physical asset or obtaining legal title is separate and follows local law. The title token goes to the keeper that calls
liquidateAsset, which does not by itself move legal title or possession.
- The appraised value is declared by the owner at
- What limits it today
- Debt, due date and installments are recorded on-chain, so both sides see the same state.
- Notice, filings and physical recovery stay off-chain and are the lessor's legal responsibility. The contract does not perform them.
- A creditor can read
getLien(id)and compare the declared value with its own appraisal before extending credit.
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- A notice period per asset class, so that disablement never comes before notice, and a permissionless
notifyPastDuecall that emits an event. - A delay of up to 7 days before a past-due lien can be liquidated, and a title auction.
- Kill-switch jurisdiction gating and legal memos are launch gates for mainnet.
- A notice period per asset class, so that disablement never comes before notice, and a permissionless
7. Terms set by the owner alone
- What can go wrong
The owner chooses the lien's terms when calling
open: the credit limit, the liquidation threshold, the due date and the creditor. The creditor does not sign or approve the lien. A creditor who serves an agent against a lien it has not read is relying on terms it did not set.setLeaseSchedulelets the owner set an installment schedule once. It replaces the due date with the current time plus the installment period, and the creditor is not asked. Tested: a lien due in 30 days with $500 drawn was rescheduled to 1 base unit every ten years, and the due date moved to 3,650 days out. Paying 1 base unit throughpayInstallmentbefore that date rolls it out by another ten years.For a creditor, the due date seen at open is not a promise. The only remaining trigger is the liquidation line.
- What limits it today
- Set-once: a second call reverts with
schedule already set. Only the owner can call it. - It is refused while the lien is liquidatable, so a past-due lien cannot be re-dated out of default.
- A lien that was ever past due is flagged
everPastDuefor good and counts as a cured-late settlement, not a clean one. - The creditor sets its own exposure: debt exists only because the creditor called
charge. ReadinggetLienbefore each charge shows the current due date and installment.
- Set-once: a second call reverts with
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- A check at open that the credit limit is covered by collateral at the threshold.
- Not in the v1 scope: creditor consent to a lien's terms, or a limit on how far a schedule can move the due date.
8. Creditor draws and the owner's brakes
- What can go wrong
The creditor records usage with chargeCharge. A draw against the credit limit, signed by the agent. It adds to the lien's debt. The contract records it; no tokens move when a charge is made.. No tokens move, and the contract cannot see whether the service was delivered. A dishonest or mistaken creditor can record debt up to the full credit limit, fees included, against the owner's collateral.
- The agent's signature is optional.
chargeneeds only the creditor.chargeWithAuthchecks the agent's EIP-712 signature for each draw, but nothing requires the creditor to use it. - An owner's freezeFrozen. A party has paused further charges on this lien. Repayment and closing still work. does not bind the creditor. The creditor can call
unfreezeand charge again (tested). The agent can freeze but cannot unfreeze. - The usage fee is added to the debt on every charge, inside the credit limit. It is owed to the treasury and paid when the debt is repaid or the lien is liquidated. The default deployment script sets it to zero.
- The agent's signature is optional.
- What limits it today
- Debt, fees included, can never pass the credit limit the owner set.
chargereverts withover limit. - In a liquidation the owner can lose at most the collateral posted in that lien. The contract pulls tokens only from the address that makes the call.
- A signed draw is bound to one lien, amount, nonce and deadline. A nonce is used once, and malleable signatures are rejected.
- Debt, fees included, can never pass the credit limit the owner set.
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- Remove role-based
charge, so that the agent's signature is the only way to draw, with cumulative vouchers and a reference hash per draw. - Not in the v1 scope: whether a creditor may lift an owner's freeze.
- Remove role-based
9. Agent reputation is forgeable
- What can go wrong
The contract keeps a repayment record per agent address,
agentStats: liens opened, settled, cured late and defaulted, total repaid and total bad debt. The record can be manufactured.- Anyone can open a lien naming any address as the agent, without that address's consent. Every later outcome is credited or charged to it, so a third party can add defaults to a victim's record.
- One address can build a clean record alone. A lien opened and closed with no draw counts as a clean settlement. Tested: five empty open-and-close cycles recorded five settlements. The repository's reference underwriter, off-chain example code, reaches its top tier at five.
totalRepaidcounts a repayment by any payer.
Do not treat
agentStatsas a credit score.- What limits it today
- The contract never reads
agentStatsto size or allow a draw. Credit limits are set by the owner, and liquidation does not depend on the record. liensSettledcounts only liens closed at zero debt and never late. A lien that went late and was cured counts underliensCuredLateinstead. A lien that was liquidated counts underliensDefaulted, with itstotalBadDebt.
- The contract never reads
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- An EIP-712 agent consent at
open, implicit when the agent opens its own lien, with ERC-1271 support for smart-account agents. This stops third parties from poisoning a record. It does not stop a party from farming its own.
- An EIP-712 agent consent at
10. Settlement token
- What can go wrong
Liens settle in ERC-20 tokens chosen at open. The contract has no token allowlist.
- If a token issuer blocks an address, a transfer to or from it fails and the whole call reverts. A creditor blocked in the debt token makes
repayrevert whenever a creditor payment is due, and one blocked in the collateral token makesliquidaterevert. The owner then cannot repay or close, and the collateral stays in escrow. A blocked owner cannotclose, and makes a liquidation that has a surplus revert. A blocked treasury reverts any payment that has a protocol part, on every lien. - The contract credits the amount it asks for, not the amount received. A token that takes a fee on transfer, or that changes balances by itself, leaves the contract holding less than it has recorded.
- Any ERC-20 can be named as collateral or debt, including one that misbehaves. The contract does not vet it.
- If a token issuer blocks an address, a transfer to or from it fails and the whole call reverts. A creditor blocked in the debt token makes
- What limits it today
- A blocked owner or creditor affects only the liens that name it. A blocked treasury affects every lien with a protocol payment.
- Creditors and owners choose the tokens. Check the token and its issuer's powers before opening or serving a lien.
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- Pull-payment balances for the creditor, owner surplus, keeper and treasury legs, so one blocked recipient cannot revert a repayment or a liquidation.
- An on-chain allowlist of settlement tokens, enforced by the contract.
11. Network and infrastructure
- What can go wrong
- L2 downtime. Base is an L2 whose transactions are ordered by a sequencer. If it stops, ordinary transactions wait until it resumes. The contract has no sequencer-uptime check and no allowance for downtime, and compares the due date with the block timestamp. A lien that passes its due date during an outage is liquidatable as soon as blocks resume, and a keeper's transaction can land before the owner's repayment.
- Reorgs. A transaction that looks included is not final until the network says so. Until then it can be reordered or replaced.
- Demo console keys. The dashboard keeper button and the lease page sign with private keys held on the server. A server-held key is exposed if the server or its secrets leak.
- Hosted pages. The consoles read chain state through a hosted server. A faulty or compromised page can show wrong numbers.
- What limits it today
- The consoles run against a testnet or a local chain with throwaway keys.
- A public deployment is read-only by default. The four routes that sign transactions answer 403 unless the chain endpoint is local or a flag turns writes on.
- You can verify any number against the contract itself. See Verifying it yourself.
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- Consoles that sign in the user's own wallet, with no server-side signing on public deployments.
- Secrets held only in a manager, scoped and rotated tokens, a keeper run in two regions, and paging on keeper failure.
- An L2 sequencer-uptime check in the contract. No change is planned for reorg risk, which belongs to the network.
12. Legal and regulatory
- What can go wrong
Parts of the system may be treated as regulated activity in some places: the hosted consoles and keepers, the usage fee paid to the treasury, and a repossession signal on a leased device. Availability can depend on jurisdiction, and a feature can be restricted or withdrawn in a place where it is not permitted. The design of the planned ENC token is undecided and subject to legal review. Nothing here is an offer of any token.
This page is not legal or financial advice.
- What limits it today
- No real funds are involved while Encumbra is testnet-only.
- The contract takes no discretionary custody. Collateral moves only by the contract's rules, with the oracle caveat in risk 2.
- What is plannedPlanned, not built
- Legal memos on money transmission, on whether the usage fee is a finance charge under state lending law, and on kill-switch jurisdiction gating, and a securities review of any token. These are launch gates for mainnet. Mainnet is not live.
What this page does not cover
This page covers the EncumbraLien contract and the web surfaces as they stand on the review date. It does not assess the third-party tokens or price feeds a lien may use, the wallets and tools you sign with, tax treatment, or a v1 contract that has not been written. For the admin's powers, the audit plan and disclosure, see Security and admin controls.
Last reviewed: 21 November 2026