Encumbra
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Security and admin controls

This page states what protects Encumbra today, what the admin key can and cannot do, which functions anyone can call, and which hardening steps are not built yet.

Proof of concept, unaudited, Base Sepolia, no real funds. No third-party audit has been done, no bug bounty is live and no disclosure channel is published. Nothing here is a guarantee. Risks explains what each limit below means in practice.

Audit status

No third-party audit of the EncumbraLien contract has been done. The table separates what exists from what is planned.

StepWhat it isStatus
Test suite42 tests across 13 files on an in-process EVM, including 120 fuzzed ERC-20 liquidations and 60 fuzzed title repossessions.Passing
Known High findingsThe security roadmap records five High findings. All five are open in the contract: agent consent at open, per-lien oracle binding and staleness, a creditor floor in the keeper waterfall, a past-due liquidation policy, and an auction for titles.Open
First private reviewAn outside firm reviews the code after the v1 changes, then reviews the fixes.Not scheduled
Second private reviewA different firm reviews the same code with fresh eyes.Not scheduled
Competitive contestAn open contest for the long tail of bugs, with judging.Not scheduled
Final review of fixesA last review of every change made after the earlier reviews.Not scheduled
Published reportsEvery report is to be published. No report exists yet.None yet

Mainnet is gated on the plan: two private reviews and a contest completed, every High and Critical finding closed, and the reports published. Passing tests are not an audit. They show the cases someone thought of.

Admin controls

Three functions are restricted to the admin address. This is the whole list: no other function checks for the admin. The address that deploys the contract is the first admin.

FunctionWhat it can changeHard boundDelay todayEvents emitted
setParamsThe protocol penalty paid on a liquidation, the keeper reward, the usage fee added to every charge, and the treasury address. Applies to liens that are already open.Each fee at most MAX_FEE_BPS, 1,000 bps (10%), checked per fee. The treasury cannot be the zero address.None. It takes effect in the same transaction.ParamsUpdated
setOracleThe price source for every lien whose collateral token differs from its debt token.The zero address is refused. Nothing else is checked: the address does not have to be a contract or report a sensible price.None. It reprices every live cross-token lien at once.None emitted.
transferAdminWho holds the admin role.The zero address is refused. It is a single step: the new address does not accept, so a mistyped address cannot be undone.None.None emitted.
The fee bound is per fee, not in total. At the cap a liquidation can cost the owner 20% of the debt, and every charge carries a 10% usage fee.

What no admin function can do directly

  • Withdraw escrowedEscrow. Held by the contract and released only by its own rules, not by any person. collateral. No function exists for it. Collateral leaves the contract only through close, liquidate and liquidateAsset.
  • Write to any lien. The admin functions touch only the global settings.
  • Pause, freeze or close a lien, or stop repayment. In every other function the admin is an ordinary address. The oracle caveat below applies to liquidation.
  • Change the contract. It is not a proxy and has no delegatecall or selfdestruct.
One indirect path exists, in both directions. setOracle changes the oracleOracle. The price source used when collateral and debt are different tokens. On the testnet it is a placeholder, not a production price feed. that prices collateral in every cross-token lien, which can make a healthy lien liquidatable. Tested: a lien holding 1,000 tokens against $100 of debt, repriced to 0.11, paid the creditor 909 tokens when it was liquidated, and the owner got 64 back. The same lever can block liquidations: an oracle that reverts, reports zero or prices collateral too high keeps a cross-token lien from being liquidated until it is past due, and a zero price blocks even that (tested). Statements that the admin cannot touch user funds are true of direct custody, and they do not cover this lever. Same-token and title liens are not affected.

What the admin cannot change

  • MAX_FEE_BPS, which is a constant, and WAD.
  • The EIP-712 domain separator, which is fixed at deployment.
  • Most of a lien's terms after open. No function at all can change the parties, the tokens, the credit limit, the liquidation threshold or a title's appraised value. The table shows what can still change on a lien, and who can change it.
Lien fieldWho can change it after open
Owner, agent, creditorNobody
Collateral token, debt token, asset classNobody
Credit limit, liquidation thresholdNobody
Title token id, appraised valueNobody
Collateral amountAnyone can add. It leaves only through close, liquidate or liquidateAsset.
DebtThe creditor adds with charge. Payers reduce it with repay and payInstallment. A liquidation settles it.
Due date and installmentsThe owner, once, with setLeaseSchedule. After that each installment payment rolls the due date forward.
Frozen flagThe owner, agent or creditor can freeze. Only the owner or creditor can unfreeze.
StatusThe owner closes a settled lien. Anyone liquidates a defaulted one.

Who can call what

Most of the contract is permissionlessPermissionless. No account, approval or allowlist is needed. Any address can call it.. Anyone can open a lien naming any creditorCreditor. The party the debt is owed to. On liquidation it is made whole before the protocol or the owner. and any agent, anyone can liquidate a defaulted lien and be paid as the keeperKeeper. Anyone who liquidates a lien that is past due or under water. The keeper is paid first from the proceeds, so enforcement does not depend on a single operator., and anyone can pay a lien's debt or add collateral to it.

WhoFunctionsNotes
Anyoneopen, openAssetThe caller becomes the owner. There is no allowlist of creditors, agents or tokens.
Anyoneliquidate, liquidateAssetOnly while the lien is past due or at the liquidation line. The caller is the keeper and is paid first. liquidateAsset needs the keeper to fund the appraised value.
Anyonerepay, payInstallment, addCollateralThe caller supplies the tokens. A third party can pay a lien's debt or add collateral to it.
AnyonegetLien, available, isServiceable, isAssetEnabled, collateralValue, healthFactor, isLiquidatable, agentStats, chargeNonce, nextIdRead-only. They change nothing and need no role.
Owner onlyclose, setLeaseScheduleclose works only when the debt is zero. setLeaseSchedule works once, and not while the lien is liquidatable.
Creditor onlycharge, chargeWithAuthThe lien must be active, not frozen and not past due, and the debt plus the usage fee must stay within the credit limit. chargeWithAuth also needs the agent's signature.
Owner, agent or creditorfreezeBlocks new charges on that lien and turns isServiceable and isAssetEnabled false, which is the signal a financed device reads. It does not block repayment, top-ups, closing or liquidation.
Owner or creditorunfreezeThe agent cannot unfreeze.
Admin onlysetParams, setOracle, transferAdminThe complete list. No other function checks for the admin.

What is not pausable, and why

There is no pause function, so nothing can be paused today. That has two sides.

  • No operator can freeze repayment or liquidation, and no operator can stop a lien that is working.
  • No operator can stop the contract if a bug appears. There is no upgrade path. A fix is a new deployment, and open liens stay on the old contract under the old code.

The only brake is the per-lien freeze. It blocks new charges on one lien and turns its isAssetEnabled signal off. A frozenFrozen. A party has paused further charges on this lien. Repayment and closing still work. lien can still be repaid, topped up, closed and liquidated. The intake pause in the plan below would cover open, openAsset and chargeWithAuth only, and never repayment, closing or liquidation.

Verifying it yourself

Check the contract rather than this page. The official address for each network is listed on Networks. If no address is listed for a network, there is no official deployment on it, and nothing should be sent to an address that claims to be one.

The explorer shows blocks, transactions and addresses for the chain this site is connected to, and decodes calls and events with the contract's ABI. Any other explorer or EVM library works too. Reading needs no wallet and no role.

import { ethers } from "ethers";

// The address listed on the Networks page for the network you are checking.
const address = process.argv[2];
const provider = new ethers.JsonRpcProvider("https://sepolia.base.org");

const lien = new ethers.Contract(
  address,
  [
    "function admin() view returns (address)",
    "function treasury() view returns (address)",
    "function oracle() view returns (address)",
    "function protocolFeeBps() view returns (uint16)",
    "function keeperRewardBps() view returns (uint16)",
    "function usageFeeBps() view returns (uint16)",
    "function MAX_FEE_BPS() view returns (uint16)",
    "function collateralValue(uint256 id) view returns (uint256)",
    "function healthFactor(uint256 id) view returns (uint256)",
    "function isLiquidatable(uint256 id) view returns (bool)",
  ],
  provider,
);

console.log("admin    ", await lien.admin());
console.log("oracle   ", await lien.oracle());
console.log("fees bps ", await lien.protocolFeeBps(), await lien.keeperRewardBps(), await lien.usageFeeBps());

const id = 1n; // the lien you want to check
console.log("collateral value", await lien.collateralValue(id));
console.log("health factor   ", ethers.formatUnits(await lien.healthFactor(id), 18));
console.log("liquidatable    ", await lien.isLiquidatable(id));
save as check.mjs and run with: node check.mjs <contract address>
  • healthFactor is collateral value divided by debt, scaled so that 1e18 is 100%. It is the largest possible number when there is no debt.
  • collateralValue is in debt-token units: the oracle price for ERC-20 collateral, and the declared appraised valueAppraised value. The value the owner declared for a title token when opening the lien. The contract checks only that it is above zero and does not verify it, so an independent appraisal matters. for a title.
  • isLiquidatable is true while the lien is active with debt above zero and either the due date has passed, or debt times 10,000 has reached collateral value times the lien's liqThresholdBps, which getLien shows.
  • Watch ParamsUpdated logs for fee and treasury changes. setOracle and transferAdmin emit nothing, so compare oracle() and admin() against an earlier reading.
  • Verified source on Basescan and Sourcify is planned for the first public deployment, and does not exist yet.

Known issues

These come from reading the contract and from the findings in the security roadmap. Each links to the risk where the effect is explained.

Findings in the security roadmap, all High and all open

  1. Agent consent. open and openAsset credit and charge outcomes to any named agent with no consent from that address, so agentStats can be forged. Risk 9.
  2. Oracle. One global oracle, no price age check and an assumption of equal decimals, repointable by the admin for every live lien. Risk 2.
  3. Keeper waterfall. The senior keeper reward can take all of a thin collateral and leave the creditor nothing, and it can cost the creditor up to the reward even when collateral exceeds the debt. The contract marks the ordering as intentional and pending a product-owner decision. Risk 3.
  4. Past due. A lien is liquidatable one second after its due date, and a solvent owner then pays the keeper reward and the protocol penalty, 3% of the debt at the reference script rates, which a repayment would not have cost. Tested on a $1,000 lien with $5,000 of collateral: $30 went to the keeper and the protocol. The contract marks the penalty on a solvent owner as deliberate and unchanged in the hardening pass.
  5. Title buy-out. A fixed price at the owner's declared value, which is capital-heavy for the keeper and stalls when the value is set too high. The contract marks it as intentional and pending a product-owner decision. Risk 4.

Other known issues

  1. Single admin, no delay. setOracle and transferAdmin emit no events. Risk 5.
  2. Placeholder oracle. The repository's MockPriceOracle lets any address set any price, and reports 1.0 for a token with no price. Risk 2.
  3. No coverage check at open. A $1,000,000 limit on $10 of collateral is accepted, and the liquidation threshold can be 100%. Risk 3.
  4. Terms set by the owner. The creditor does not approve a lien, and setLeaseSchedule can move the due date out, once, with no say for the creditor. Risk 7.
  5. Empty settlements. A lien opened and closed with no draw counts as a clean settlement, so a single address can build a record of them. Tested: five did. Risk 9.
  6. Draw path. Role-based charge needs no agent signature, and a creditor can lift an owner's freeze. Risk 8.
  7. Blocked recipients. A recipient the token issuer blocks reverts a repayment or a liquidation. Risk 10.
  8. Retroactive fees. A fee change reaches liens that are already open. Risk 5.
  9. Wording that overstates. The contract's header comment says the admin can never touch user funds, which is true of direct transfers and not of the oracle lever. It also says the creditor is made whole on default, which holds only up to the value of the collateral (Risk 3).

Planned hardening

This is the v1 contract scope. None of it is built, and the current contract changes when it lands. Items are in the order the scope lists them.

ItemWhat it addsStatus
Agent consent at openAn EIP-712 consent from the named agent with per-agent nonces, implicit when the agent opens its own lien, a zero agent rejected, and ERC-1271 for smart-account agents. Closes the third-party poisoning in risk 9.Not built
Per-lien oracle bindingEach lien snapshots its own feed adapter, with a maximum price age, decimals normalisation, an L2 sequencer-uptime check, a default oracle that affects new liens only, and a migration that needs owner and creditor. Closes most of risk 2.Not built
Keeper floorThe keeper reward is capped relative to what is seized, so the creditor keeps at least 80% of it, plus a flat tip paid outside the seizure.Not built
Cure delay and noticeA per-lien delay of up to 7 days before a past-due lien can be liquidated, a permissionless past-due notice, a notice delay before a leased asset is disabled, and a lower penalty for a solvent past-due lien.Not built
Title auctionReplaces the fixed-price buy-out. The price decays over 72 hours, the owner can redeem until the sale, the creditor can bid its claim, and ERC-20 collateral with a stale feed sells by the same auction.Not built
Vouchers and one draw pathCumulative vouchers, an operator role so a creditor can let a hosted submitter act, and removal of role-based charge so the agent's signature is the only way to draw.Not built
Pull payments and token allowlistClaimable balances for the creditor, owner, keeper and treasury, and an on-chain list of settlement tokens. Closes risk 10.Not built
Coverage check at openThe credit limit times the liquidation threshold must not exceed the collateral value, at open and at addCollateral.Not built
Admin hardening and intake pauseA 3-of-5 multisig behind a 48-hour timelock, a two-step admin transfer, and a 2-of-4 guardian that can pause open, openAsset and chargeWithAuth only. repay, close, liquidation and auctions are never pausable.Not built
Invariant suite24 stated properties run under Foundry and Medusa.Not built

Outside the contract, mainnet also needs the audits and published reports above, event monitoring with paging, a live bug bounty, rehearsed incident runbooks, the legal memos listed in Risk 12, and value caps per lien and for the protocol at launch. None of these is done.

Bug bounty and disclosure

No bug bounty is live, and no disclosure channel is published yet. A disclosure channel will be published before the first public deployment. Until then there is no official address for reports, and an address in a message that claims to be from Encumbra should not be treated as one.

Planned, not built:

  • A security.txt file that follows RFC 9116 and points at the channel.
  • Coordinated disclosure with a 90-day window.
  • A bounty with a testnet tier while Encumbra runs on Base Sepolia and a larger one once the mainnet bytecode is final. No reward sizes are published.
  • A public post-mortem within 14 days of an incident that loses or freezes collateral, compromises the admin key or the oracle, or causes wrong accounting.

Last reviewed: 21 November 2026